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I. THE EUROPEAN SYSTEM OF HUMAN RIGHTS
A. The American Influence
In order to understand the American contribution to the European system of
human rights,' it is necessary to go back to the situation at the close of the Second
* Professor of Jurisprudence, University of Stockholm; Director of Studies, Institutet for offentlig och
internationell r-tt, Stockholm.
1. Among the early literature on the European Convention on Human Rights, see generally RoBEsroN, THE LAw
OF INERNA1ONAL INtTr.ONS m EUROPE (1961); Coblentz & Warshaw, European Convention for the Protection of Human
952 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 47:951
World War. This is the time when the world saw the emergence of the two
superpowers to which we have grown accustomed: the Soviet Union and the United
States of America. The Soviet advance and progress was impressively manifested in
February 1948, when the Communist Action Committees seized power in Czecho-
slovakia and seemingly irrevocably included that country in the bloc of Socialist
states, known as "the Socialist Camp." With the seizure of Czechoslovakia, the
Soviets were able to establish their Socialist legal system throughout Eastern Europe.
In order to see the American influence on the European system of human rights, an
understanding of the chief differences between the Anglo-American legal systems
and the Marxist-based Socialist ones is required. These systems disagree fundamen-
tally about the nature and source of human rights. This disagreement has formed the
basis for the conflict over human rights within Europe.
"Human rights" was the notion that was to dominate the coming decades in
many ways. The significance of human rights was manifested in the Universal
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 44 CAiuF. L. Rxv. 94 (1956); Eustathiades, La Convention europiene des droits de
Ihomme et le Statut du Conseil de l'Europe, 52 FRPEDOEswARm 332 (1953-1955); Golsong, Das Rechtsschutzsystem der
Europdischen Menschenrechtkonvention, Karlsruhe (1958); Golsong, Die Europaische Konvention zum Schutz der
Menschenrechte und Grundfreiheiten, 10 JARRBUcH DES OFFEmrscHEN RFarrs (Germany 1961); Golsong, The European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in a German Court, 33 Barr. Y.B. lNr'L L.
317 (1957); Green, The European Convention on Human Rights, 5 WoRD Ait. 432 (1951); Honig, The European Human
Rights Convention, 105 L.J. 759 (1955); Horvath, The European Court of Human Rights, 5 Ossrumoiuscsm 7znsrmomrF
FOR OFFEN UC S Rxcur (Austria) 166 (1953); Lauterpacht, The Proposed European Court of Human Rights, 35
TRANsAcnoNs OF ms GRollus Soc'Y 25 (1950); Modinos, La Convention europienne des droits de r'homme, ses origines,
ses objectives, ses realisations, 1 EUROPEAN Y.B. 141 (1955); Mosler, Organisation und Verfahren des Europdischen
Gerichtshofspfir Menschenrechte, 20 Zu-rscuPtwr FUR Aust..DtSCncs OFEzruacuEs REcNT UND V6ERRmir (Germany) 415
(1959-1960); Partsch, Die Entstehung der Europdischen Menschenrechtskonvention, 15 ZsrrscuRtmr FOR AusLXNnDcusS
Oamc Es RrcHT UND VL, RRECtr (Germany) 631 (1954); Partsch, Die Europaische Menschenrechtskonvention vor den
nationalen Parlamenten, 17 ZsrrscH uFr FOR AusaNi.scuss OEucpsnam REcur UrN VtEsr, r (Germany) 93 (1956);
Robertson, The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights, 27 BRrr. Y.B. INr'L L. 145 (1950); Robertson,
The European Court of Human Rights, 9 A?. J. Co.%up. L. 1 (1960); Robertson, The European Court of Human Rights,
8 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 396 (1959); Robertson, The European Convention on Human Rights, YEARBOOK F Hu,.ts Rimrs
FoR 1951 (1953); Waldock, The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
34 BRrr. Y.B. IWr'L L. 356 (1958); Wiebringhaus, Die Rom-Konvention fir Menschenrechte in der Praxis der
Strassburger Menschenrechtskommission, Saarbiicken (1959); Wiebringhaus, Ein internationaler Gerichtshof zum
Schutz der Menschenrechte, 55 FRiErEsswARTE 1 (1959-1960); Wiebringhaus, Institution und bisherige Rechtsprechung
der Strassburger Menschenrechtskommission, 54 FPiosssswARTE 252 (1957-1958); Weil, Decisions on Inadmissible
Applications by the European Conunission on Human Rights, 54 Au. J. INr'L L. 874 (1960); Comment, The European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 49 CAUrP. L. REv. 172 (1961).
For more recent, important literature on the Convention and its system, see K.J. PAR Scn, Dm REcusm uto FRirRnnrnu
DuR EuRoPktscHn MWNSCENRECHrs9oNvEmnoN (1966) (also in: NEUMANN, BsrrUrANm, NIPPRPs : DI GRJNDRECNTE, Vol. 1
(1966); H. GURADzE, Dm EoRopXisCHE MEN ScHENREcrTSKONVENION, KotlrerrAR (1968); J.E.S. FAwcErT, THE APrmcx'ox OF
m EUROPEAN CoNvENTnoNx O HumrAN Rios (1969); H. WALmm, DiE EusoptiscE MENsaNrsc~trrsoRNuNo, BmIRXoE zuN
AuSLXNDISCEN 6tsrucuE REcHr uND VLKEscirRE, Vol. 53 (1970); S. TRErCsE., Dts EutRoPRIsCR MENSaCso]-
RECTSKONVENTION, nm SCHtrz DuR PEsS6NucHsNt FREaE UNr DIE SCtwEEsISCtN STAnOzESSRR rM (1974); F.G. JAcoas, THE
EUROPEAN CoNVEsmNON ON HumAN RIGHTs, (1975); U. HopntAN-REuv, DiE M6oucnsKurrE DE GsurmsnRUrErscuSCHXrtKL.No ACH
DEN ART. 8-11 Ass. 2 DER EutRopXtscH MENscweRCHrsKoxvENTnoN (1976); H. MosLER, R. Bsu, mrr AND M. Hay (Ems.),
GRUusDRECrSScHttrZ IN EUROPA, BsnrXos ztu AUSANDISCUEN 6ru=ercHs REcur urN V6xxRrP (1977); D. Poxcsr, LA
PROTECION DE L'ACC'JSi PAR LA CONVENTION EUROPiENNE DES DROrrS Ds L'Hoitrt (1977); D. BtENDuL, VosautmiLm UND
AusLEGENo' ERR CtRuNEN ZUR EuRoPXmSc'NN MEN sC ENRCMSKONVENON (1978); E. LDE, I.I. ORTEGA ND M. Skrcuz MoR6N,
EL SImTvNA EUROPEO DE PROTECCI6N DE LOS DEREC-OS HUMANOS. ESTUDIO OF LA CONVENCI6N Y DE LA SURISPRUDENCIA DEL TRsuNA.
Eusopo us DERscuos HuutAsos (1979); P. VAN DuK AND G.J.H. VAN Hoop, Ds EURoPESE coNVENTIs Im WOR IN PRAAKTSuK (1979);
G. G Eot, LA WTUM.A EOROPEA DEI DiRrM DLL'UOMo (1979).
See also J. ABR. FRowEIN & W. PnuKF-RT, EUROPISCHE MENscuNRxacmsKovsmnoN. EMRK-Ko.t.mamrAR (1985); Z.
NEOjAi, HuiuAN RIoTs UrDE ru EUROPEAN CoNvEnoN (1978); RoauRrsON, HuMtAN Riotris rN EURoPE (1977); F. CAsrBERo,
THE EUROPEAN CoNVEmON ON HumAN Riors (1974); J.W.S. FAwcEr, THE APPLICATO, OF nE EUROPEAN CoNVE NTON ON HuMN
Ritrs (1969).
HUMAN RIGHTS IN SWEDEN
Declaration of Human Rights in 1948,2 the very year Czechoslovakia fell. That there
are "fundamental human rights" was declared an article of faith, "reaffirmed" by
the peoples of the United Nations in the UN Charter. 3 In spite of the fact that the
Universal Declaration reflected no single comprehensive theory of the relation of the
individual to society, the Soviet Union abstained from supporting the Declaration
when it was adopted.
The Soviet view of human rights is rooted in Marxist-Leninist theory. 4 Under it,
law, like government, is the product of the underlying economic relationships in
society. The relationship between the individual and the state in society is defined by
the forces of production, and human rights is part of that relationship. Hence, human
rights derive their content and nature from those forces and the class relationships
manifested in the state. Because the law can never rise above a society's socio-
economic system, it follows that the state must be the source of human rights. Soviet
theorists, therefore, believe that individuals can have no inherent rights. Instead, the
state confers rights upon its citizens. Within such a framework, the individual can
hold no right against the state.
This much being said, the contrast to the American view of natural rights and of
constitutionalism is most apparent.5 The American approach, unlike the Soviet
approach, is rooted in the Enlightment doctrine of "natural rights." Such a doctrine
was first articulated clearly by John Locke, who argued that man possesses certain
rights by virtue of his humanity, and not by virtue of social convention or law.6 In
both Europe and America, Locke's views came to carry great weight. In the 1780's,
both Europe and America adopted new constitutions addressing the issue of the
natural rights.
On August 4, 1789, the French National Assembly resolved that a Declaration
of Rights should antecede the new Constitution. It was completed by August 26,
1789. The Declaration of Rights stated in Article 2 that the purpose of all political
2. G.A. Res. 217, 3 U.N. GAOR (A/810) at 71.
3. U.N. CRmER preamble.
4. For a recent survey of the human rights problem in the Marxist perspective, see Dean, Beyond Helsinki: The
Soviet View of Human Rights in International Law, 21 VA. J. IT'L. L. 55 (1980).
5. See generally Henkin, Constitutional Rights and Human Rights, 13 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 593, 602, 609
(1978) and Henkin, Rights: American and Human, 79 CoLSi. L. Rv. 405, 406 n.4 (1979). In R. BmE, Govrxssmsr
BY JUDIcIAR, Tm TRAssoR. oTioN or Ta FouRsimENi AisNsarr (1977), the argument is put forward that the Founders of
the American Constitution were too "deeply committed to positivism" to confuse law with natural rights. Id. at 252. This
argument seems to not fully take into account the natural rights' character to establish limits on the legitimate power of
government (cf. the French Declaration of Rights of 1789) although it is reflected directly in the language of the
Amendments covering rights "retained by the people" independently of the Constitution (U.S. Const. amend. IX) and
powers "reserved ... to the people." (U.S. Const. amend. X).
Retained rights and reserved powers seem to be in perfect harmony with Locke's approach, explaining that the
compact out of which emerged the state must be understood so that the participants only "give up all the power, necessary
to the ends for which they unite into society. " The power that is not necessary for these ends is retained by the individuals.
A most expressive formulation of this point of view, completely undisturbed by positivism to which everybody
claimed adherence, will be found in the committee report that was drafted by the constitutionalists in the Grand Duchy
of Finland, (at that time part of Czarist Russia) after the victory of 1906. Explaining what was meant by the term, a
Constitutional State, they stated: "should anybody, even be it the Monarch himself, make command in matters as to which
the Law gives him no such power, no law can be created by such command and consequently can arise no corresponding
duty with binding force." See J. SuNtBERo, HRicERsraoLrmsi a FRNLAst's STacciaL oR LAw 21 (1983).
6. 1. LocxE, EssAs ON ma LAw or NAOJRE (W. von Leyden ed. 1954).
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association is the conservation of Man's natural and inalienable rights: freedom,
property, security, and resistance to oppression. In the Constitution of 1791, the
matter was explained even further in the opening language of Article 3: "The
legislative power cannot make any laws that violate or hinder the natural and civil
rights."
On the American side, the same approach was taken. The American notion of
rights reflects a theory applicable to all human beings in every political society. The
rights of the individual are natural, not a gift from society or from the government.
The individual is autonomous before he enters into society. Some of the individual's
original autonomy is indeed retained as "inalienable rights" that are immune from
invasion even by his own government. The American Constitution of 1787 does not
create, establish, or grant rights, or even declare them. The individual rights of
Americans do not derive from the Constitution; they antecede it. The Constitution
contemplates only that these pre-existing rights shall be respected by government.
The rights do not derive from official grant and are not enjoyed by official grace.
They are above government. This is a form of limited government, in which authority
is balanced carefully to minimize intrusiveness. The tendency is to de-emphasize the
activity of the state in the lives of its citizens. The government is to be a watchman,
a policeman, leaving the individuals free for the "pursuit of happiness."
It belongs to the American tradition that these rights, which first were felt as
having no need of formulation since they were natural, eventually were given formal
recognition in the first ten amendments which were adopted with the Constitution on
June 21, 1788. Today's Americans know well the freedoms and rights here
enumerated, and how they have grown during the 200 years of the history of the
United States through interplay between the political branches of government and the
American judiciary practicing judicial control of state action. It follows that a "right"
in Soviet terms is not a "right" at all in the American sense, and vice versa.
B. The European Approach
The European Convention on Human Rights7 lacks legislative institutions and
seems short on enforcement powers, but it was established as a European interna-
tional system to protect fundamental rights in a judicial procedure. Thereby, it has
firmly attached the European states to the American tradition of protecting funda-
mental rights on the basis of a court procedure. The success of the Convention
system, 8 hence, stands out as one of the great successes of an American tradition and
one of the great defeats of the Socialist philosophy. How great an achievement this
really is perhaps is not apparent to Americans unless they recall the situation of the
late 1940s.
7. The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, November 4, 1950,
213 U.N.T.S. 221.
8. The success of the Convention system is manifest in a history of over 30 years, the handling of almost 12,000
cases, and the right of individual complaint having spread, by declarations made under Article 25 of the Convention, to
some 300 million Europeans. See EuRomAN CoM.wssioN ON HUmAN Rism's, STocKrAxmo ON THE EuRoFEAN Coxverno oN
HusiAN Rairs: A PERIoDic NoTE ON THE CoNc em REsuLTs AcmEvEn UNDER THE CoNvemoN (1979).
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Among the Europeans, on the other hand, testimony is often explicit. Polys
Modinos, then Deputy Secretary General of the Council of Europe, had a keen eye
for the quasi-constitutional character of the Convention system in the European
political community. "[B]y listing and defining those civil and political rights on
which democracy is founded the authors of the Convention have succeeded in laying
down the constitutional rules without which the Political Community could not
exist."9
Gerard Wiarda, the former Dutch President of the European Court of Human
Rights, refers to the court as "a Constitutional Court for all European nations." 10
Professor Jochen Abr. Frowein, Vice-President of the European Commission on
Human Rights, likes to refer to the Convention proceedings as "a European
Constitutional Complaint to the Strasbourg organs.""I Frowein has been very explicit
in acknowledging the European indebtedness to the American model.
What is the Convention about? Is it not really a Convention which tries to protect what one
might call a certain identity, developed in Western Europe and North America? ... Is it not
quite important that here an example should be set that by judicial procedures before the
Commission and the Court something similar to this great jurisprudence ... developed by
the United States Supreme Court, on the basis of the Bill of Rights of the United States
Constitution, should develop in a single European System? I submit that besides other
European institutions, one specific human rights institution in Europe serves a great goal and
should be developed for that end.' 2
C. The Lawyer's Approach
The European system of human rights is based on a lawyer's approach. It is a
system administered by lawyers. This sets it apart from many other systems in the
field. The lawyer's approach shows in the very style and form of the European
Convention on Human Rights. The first section of the Convention, Articles 8 through
11,13 which define the rights and freedoms, follows a rather stable pattern. In each
9. Modinos, Effects and Repercussions of the European Convention of Human Rights, 11 Irr'L & CoMP. L.Q.
1097, 1107 (1962).
10. Martin, Europe's Court of Last Resort, READER's DIGEST, Swedish edition, Nov. 1985.
11. Frowein, Recent Developments Concerning the European Convention on Human Rights, in LAws, RIGHTS AM
THm E RoEA Co.wENV ON ON Ht RIrs 14 (J. Sundberg ed. 1986).
12. Id. at 27.
13. ARTICLE 8
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as in accordance
with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the
economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or
morals, or for the protection of the righti and freedoms of others.
ARTICLE 9
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change
his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest
his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance.
2. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by
law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order,
health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
ARTICLE 10
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to
receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers.
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article, the first paragraph states the right in a more or less precise formula, and the
second paragraph states what restrictions of this right are permissible. What loyalty
each European state owes to the Convention may be gathered from Articles 17 and
18,14 both of which are concerned with the purpose behind the governmental-
legislative or administrative-interference.
It was not so in the beginning. When the Committee of Ministers convened in
November 1949, it refused to accept the draft Convention hammered out in the
Parliamentary Assembly in which the rights to be guaranteed were merely enumer-
ated; and control of the restrictions on the rights was contained in general form. The
Committee of Ministers instructed the Secretary General of the Council of Europe to
invite each of the governments of member states to nominate an expert to a
Committee of Legal Experts to draw up a draft Convention which would serve as a
basis for future discussion. This Committee was left with the task of determining
whether the rights should be more precisely defined or left as general statements of
principles. The Swedish Government appointed to this Committee Judge Torsten
Salfn who had experience from the Mixed Tribunals in Egypt. The Norwegian
Government appointed Advocate Ole Roed and Counselor Einar Lochen, and the
Danish Government appointed Counselor Birger Dons Moller. The Committee of
Legal Experts convened in Strasbourg in February 1950.
When the legal experts met, it was their task to determine how to reduce the
rights to positive law, how to make them concrete rather than abstract. Although
some experts were inclined to side with the Parliamentary Assembly, others opposed
this very strongly. The representative of the United Kingdom in particular felt "that
since the Convention was to enforce human rights, it was essential that the rights
should be defined as precisely as possible.' ' 5 This opinion was noted in the
This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema
enterprises.
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such
formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic
society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder
or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for
preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality
of the judiciary.
ARTICLE 11
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association with others, including
the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests.
2. No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as are prescribed by law and
are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, for the prevention of
disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
This Article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights by members
of the armed forces, of the police or of the administration of the State.
14. ARTICLE 17
Nothing in this Convention may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage
in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein or
at their limitation to a greater extent than is provided for in the Convention.
ARTICLE 18
The restrictions permitted under this Convention to the said rights and freedoms shall not be applied for any
purpose other than those for which they have been prescribed.
15. BEDAR, HusuN Miors ma EURoPE: A SToD OF TI MACHInMY OF HtmN RiGHTs PROTrECnON OF TIM COUNCIL OF
EURoPE 24 (1980).
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following way in the report on the drafting procedures that Judge Sal6n later
published:
According to these people, it was a necessary condition for the adoption of a Convention that
the various rights which were to be protected were strictly defined, and so should be too the
restrictions allowed of these rights. Otherwise, it would be impossible for a State to know
to what obligations it subjected itself by adhering to the Convention.' 6
This reasoning persuaded the Committee of Legal Experts to engage in rather
precise formulations of the guaranteed rights. The Committee of Ministers considered
the suggestions of the legal experts in April 1950. The Ministers agreed to set up a
Committee of Government Experts which was charged with preparing on the political
level the decisions which the Committee of Ministers would have to make. Judge
Saldn recalled:
During this conference, the chair was held by the Swedish delegate, Counselor Sture Petr6n.
Under his expert guidance, it was succeeded to hammer out a uniform text that corresponded
to the views of the majority. It built upon the proposal that included a closer definition of
the rights set out in the draft Convention.17
Interestingly enough, it seems that the reduction of the rights into positive-law
formulations served the purpose of safeguarding the interests of the state rather than
the interests of the individual. The state was to enjoy legal security against other
states; this was the paramount consideration. In this way the individuals were given
a legal instrument for their protection which lawyers could handle, but this instrument
was simply a by-product of the paramount consideration.
Having retired as Swedish Minister of Foreign Affairs, however, Professor
Osten Und6n had second thoughts. He now questioned whether Sweden "perhaps
had gone too far in contributing to the Convention being drafted too much in
detail." 18 "Due to this formulation in detail, you had increased the possibilities for
and the risks for different interpretations of the Convention." '1 9 He now argued
against the machinery for international protection of human rights as being too
complicated and too expensive. "Those problems of a more subtle character which
may be expected in practice to be referred to the Court of the Council of
Europe. . .hardly require the big apparatus for which the Council of Europe's
member states are responsible."- 20
Today, more than thirty years later, the operations of the organs set up under the
Convention have added even further precision to the terms of the Convention. In
order to ensure that these elaborations of the meaning of the Convention language are
kept alive, the Commission Secretariat began in the late 1960s to collect the case law
in several memoranda, focusing on specific topics. The first compilation was
16. Saldn, "Europaradets konvention om mankliga rattigheter och freiheter," FoRVALTNMGSRATTsuG iosKRn'r 2
(1951).
17. Id. at 3.
18. 'kanske gatt for langt i medverkan till konventiones detaljmassiga utformning': Unden, Cm FN:soch
Europaradets domstolar, Svensk Juristtidning, 661 (1963).
19. Id. at 659.
20. Id. at 661.
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published in 1971 and dealt with treatment in prisons. In the preface, the Secretary,
A. B. McNulty, wrote, "[T]his publication is not a legal commentary, but it is
designed to indicate the impact of the Convention in various areas and thereby the
standards which are beginning to emerge regarding the Convention's application." 2
The first and second compilations of this kind centered on the delimitation of the
rights, but the fourth one looked very much like an instruction for legislatures.
Entitled "Human Rights and Their Limitations," the compilation stated that:
The application of restrictions provided for in the Convention is not without limits. On the
one hand, such restrictions may not be applied for any purpose other than those for which
they have been prescribed (Article 18); and on the other hand, their application is limited by
the general protection against discriminatory treatment (Article 14). However, it seems clear
by now that only such restrictions may be applied as are expressly provided for in the
Convention; and that there is no new room for the adoption of additional inherent limitations
applicable to certain groups of applicants, e.g., prisoners.
Finally, it should be observed that, although it is for the domestic authorities and courts
of the Contracting Parties to be the first judge in the application of any restrictions on the
rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention, it is for the Commission, and ultimately
the Committee of Ministers or the Court of Human Rights to judge whether the restrictions
imposed in a particular case were justified. In accomplishing this task, the competent organs
under the Convention will balance the interest of the individual in the protection of his
human rights against those of the State to protect its democratic institutions. In this process
of determining the relationship between the individual and the State they will bear in mind
that the purpose of the High Contracting Parties in concluding the Convention was not to
concede to each other reciprocal rights and obligations, in pursuance of their individual
national interest, but to realize the aims and ideals of the Council of Europe, as expressed
in its Statute, and to establish a common public order of the free democracies of Europe
with the object of safeguarding their common heritage of political traditions, ideals,
freedoms and the rule of law. (Applications no. 788/60, Austria against Italy, Yearbook
4, 116, 138).
D. Nothing Succeeds Like Success
The first ratification of the Convention came from the United Kingdom on
March 8, 1951, no doubt because the country hoped thereby to set an example. After
all, it was Winston Churchill who had called for European unity and the foundation
of the Council of Europe. The second ratification came from Nonvay, and the third
from Sweden. Sweden also made the first declaration under Article 25, accepting for
an unlimited period the right of individuals to petition the Commission claiming a
violation of human rights by a member state.22 Thereafter, ratifications followed at
21. EUROPEAN COm.MISSiON FHuMAN Rdorrrs, CAsE-LAw Topics: HuuA- RITS IN PRISON (1971).
22. ARTICLE 25
1. The Commission may receive petitions addressed to the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe from any
person, non-governmental organisation or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one
of the High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in this Convention, provided that the High Contracting
Party against which the complaint has been lodged has declared that it recognises the competence of the
Commission to receive such petitions. Those of the High Contracting Parties who have made such a declaration
undertake not to hinder in any way the effective exercise of this right.
2. Such declarations may be made for a specific period.
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irregular intervals, and on September 3, 1953, Luxembourg supplied the tenth
ratification, which made the Convention come into force. The sixth declaration
necessary under Article 25 (4) for the functioning of the individual petition system
was made by the Federal Republic of Germany on July 5, 1955. The United Kingdom
followed in 1966, Italy in 1973, and France and Spain in 1981. Today the right of
individual petition is recognized by all member states except some in the eastern
comer of the Mediterranean, notably Turkey, Cyprus, and Malta.
Altogether this has meant that the European Commission has considered a total
of over 11,000 individual applications. Of these, only some 300 individual petitions
have been declared admissible; but this should not deceive the observer since those
petitions declared inadmissible may have involved prejudicial questions of law, the
determination of which, even if the result was that the application was declared
inadmissible, may have meant an important contribution to the body of case law. The
Commission has borne the brunt of this enormous caseload. The cases before the
Court have been few, altogether perhaps some 150 or so; and for a very long period
of time, the Commission alone was the only truly functioning organ under the
Convention.
The Commission was long under a strong Scandinavian influence. Its second
president was Sture Petrdn, one of the founding fathers of the Convention who served
on the Committee of Government Experts. The third president was the Danish
Professor Max Sorensen. At the present time, the Commission's president is the
Danish Professor Carl Aage Ncrgaard.
Austria was one of the first countries to formally allow the Convention to operate
in the domestic legal sphere. It did so by making the Convention in its substantive
parts an annex to the Austrian Constitution. A sequence of lost cases from the late
1950s and early 1960s was followed in Austria by legislative amendments to bring
Austrian statutory law into harmony with the decisions of the Commission and the
Court .3
In summary, then, the Convention system has been an immense success. More
than 300 million people today enjoy the right of individual petition. The judgment of
the European Court of Human Rights "carries the collective weight of Europe's
democratic traditions," proclaims the present Spanish Secretary General of the
Council of Europe, Marcelino Oreja. 24 According to Gerard Wiarda, the Dutch
former President of the Court, "The Convention is the Ten Commandments for the
nations of Western Europe."5
3. The declarations shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe who shall transmit
copies therof to the High Contracting Parties and publish them.
4. The Commission shall only exercise the powers provided for in this Article when at least six High Contracting
Parties are bound by declarations made in accordance with the preceding paragraphs.
23. See W. Pahr, Opening Speech, 3 Rsvu INTmNAmo.NAI DE DRorr PENAL 21, 22 (1978).
24. Martin, Europe's Court of Last Resort, REAas's DiGEst, Swedish edition, Nov. 1985.
25. Id.
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I. SWEDEN AND THE EUROPEAN CONVENTiON
A. The Period of No Complaints
"What Government would ever hit upon the idea of e.g. summoning Sweden
before the Council of Europe's Court for an alleged violation of the fundamental
rights and freedoms set out in the Convention?" wrote Professor Osten Unddn in
1963, having retired as Foreign Minister. 26 He probably voiced the opinion of most
Swedes at that time. A year later, Professor Alvar Nelson noted that the Convention
"has hardly been taken seriously in our welfare society.'"27 Even 20 years later, an
informed voice from the judiciary could tell a reporter in reference to human rights
under the Convention that "you have somehow failed in clean habits, legally
speaking, when talking about them. '28Some of Sweden's ambivalence to the Court
was a matter of national pride. "Since Sweden was considered to be among the most
well-developed countries, it was hardly conceivable that its legal system could be
below the minimum standard set by the Convention." '2 9
Much of its ambivalence was due to the fact that the political and bureaucratical
leadership of the time was simply not aware of the European Convention. At inter-
national gatherings devoted to the subject of human rights, where all other participants
lectured on human rights in general and the European Convention in particular, the
representative of the high Swedish bureaucracy would speak about something else,
such as the role of the Ombudsman. When Dr. Hans Blix, later Foreign Minister of
Sweden, took part in the Symposium on the International Law of Human Rights, which
was held at the Howard University School of Law in 1965, he did not touch on the
notion of "human rights" a single time. 30 As late as 1979, the Swiss professor Stefan
Trechsel could observe at the International Congress of Penal Law in Hambourg that
"no mention of international protection of human rights in criminal procedural is made
at all" in the National Reports from Sweden and Turkey, although both had ratified
the Convention. 31 Or if somebody was aware of the Convention, perhaps he had not
fully understood its implications. Professor Stig Stromholm wrote:
Being a member of the Committee of Experts on Human Rights for some years during the
early 1970's, I had in that capacity especially good opportunities to compare the Swedish
society under the rule-of-law (det svenska i-ittssamhiillet) with the other states of the Council
of Europe. Not a single time could I find a question in which the Swedish legal standard was
less, or less secure than in the other countries.32
Indeed, until 1981, there were very few complaints of a Swedish origin brought
to Strasbourg, and those brought were very minor ones. The annual number remained
between five and ten. Not even the application that was introduced on June 9, 1972,
26. SvJT 659 (1963).
27. A. Nelson, Rattsvetenskap en i dagens samhalle, in FEsrsravrs nL. KARL OvEcRoA 461 (1964).
28. ExvRmss 10 April 4, 1983.
29. Petr~n, in Lws, RIGMs, AND Ta EuorPeAN CowvemnmoN ox HM.Au RG Ms 41 (J. Sundberg ed. 1986).
30. Blix, A Pattern of Effective Protection: The Ombudsman, 11 How. L.J. 386 (1965).
31. Trechsel, The Protection of Human Rights in Criminal Procedure, 3 REvuE INrERNA1oALE DE Dsorr PiNAL 586
(1978); cf. Berg & Cars, Protection of Human Rights in Criminal Proceedings, id. at 340-55.
32. S. Stramholm, Svenska Dagbladet (January 22, 1984).
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by Professor Folke Schmidt of the University of Stockholm relating to the new system
of labor law in Sweden received any noteworthy attention in the media or
elsewhere.3 3 A "mass media wall" protected the Swedish people; the "spiral of
silence" operated to suppress all disturbing news. 34 Indeed, on March 28, 1983, the
Faculty of Law in Stockholm made history by declaring solemnly and for the record
that human rights was not a matter for scholarly research.
B. The Period of Massive Complaints
Today, Sweden is a European sensation. This has to do with the dramatic rise
in the number of complaints of human rights violations. In Strasbourg, statistically,
complaints are distinguished between provisional files and registered complaints.
Complaints originating in Sweden present the following picture during the first years
of the 1980s:
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
provisional files 42 72 240 192 168
registered complaints 8 18 46 51 64
As may be discerned from these statistical figures, Sweden today has some 60
or so cases pending at different stages before the Convention organs in Strasbourg.
Proportionately speaking, this is more than any other country belonging to the
Convention. A sudden peak was reached in 1983 with respect to provisional files.
This, it would seem, was the year in Sweden for the breakthrough of the idea
imbedded in the European Convention. Apparently something great happened in
1983. This represents the success of an idea with a definite American coloring.
I. THE EXTERNAL HISTORY OF THE CONvENrION IN SWEDEN
A. A Fit of Absentmindedness?
Looking back at Sweden's history with the Convention, one may be surprised at
the sense of ease which surrounded Sweden's making of the declaration under Article
25. It was made simultaneously with the ratification of the Convention and almost
without prior discussion. Further, it was made without any limit in time. It looks
indeed as if it had been done in a fit of absentmindedness.
In a way it was so. Sture Petrdn played an important role in the drafting of the
treaty in his capacity as Chairman of the Committee of Government Experts. From
33. Schmidt and Dahlstr6m v. Sweden, Application 5589/72, 19 ECHR YB 484 (1976), 1 EHRR 632. The case
went almost unnoticed in Sweden although Folke Schmidt introduced some short references to it in his textbooks in labor
law. Internationally, the case attracted more attention. See generally Forde, The European Convention on Human
Rights and Labor Law, 31 Am. J. Cow. L. 301 (1983).
34. As to the notions of the "media wall" and the "spiral of silence," see generally Noelle-Neumann, The Spiral
of Silence: A Theory of Public Opinion, 24 J. Co.m. 43-51 (1974); and Sundberg, The Media and the Formation of Law,
in FEsruRuv'r FUr Damcn Outim 447, 449-57 (R. Herzberg ed. 1985).
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his reports it is known that the Swedish governmental interest at that time mostly
focused on the powers to be given to the Committee of Ministers. The present
formulations in Article 32 are in fact largely the result of a Swedish compromise
suggestion put forward by Petrrn under instruction from the Swedish Foreign
Minister. The cardinal point was to avoid giving the Committee of Ministers the
power to dictate the legislative changes a Government would have to make as a result
of being found in violation of the Convention. The Committee of Ministers was seen
as the end station of the proceedings before the Commission. From that end station
it should be possible for a respondent government, exercising influence as a full
member of the Committee, to bridle the Commission. In this light, making the
declaration under Article 25 was not a risky move.
B. Importance of the Foreign Minister, Professor Undin
The drafting of the European Convention did not take more than a year and a
half. At that time, the Swedish Minister of Foreign Affairs was Professor Osten
Undrn. He exercised a decisive influence not only through the drafting work through
instructions to his right-hand man, Sture Petrrn,35 but also in shaping the general
attitude in Sweden toward the Convention. This requires some explanation.
Osten Undrn had a towering position in Swedish political life. He was a Cabinet
Minister by 1917 and had been in turn Minister of Justice and Minister of Foreign
Affairs in numerous Cabinets formed thereafter. In 1945, he became the Minister of
Foreign Affairs in the Cabinet formed by Per Albin Hansson; and he remained in that
position until 1962. Thereafter and until his retirement in 1965, he exercised his
influence as a member of the Diet, the Swedish legislature.
Thus, Osten Unddn totally dominated the period during which the Convention
was drafted and came to a life of its own. The two Ministers of Justice who
functioned during this period, Herman Zetterberg and Ingvar Lindell, had little or no
impact. Unddn unilaterally decided the position that Sweden was to take in relation
to the European Convention on Human Rights. Besides being Minister of Foreign
Affairs, he was a respected professor of law, and a senior leading figure in the ruling
Social Democratic Party. He thus possessed rank, political power, and scholarly
truth, at least insofar as Sweden was concerned. If anyone was to suggest a position
on human rights different from that favored by Und~n, he was committing politcal
suicide and scholarly heresy. Very few did. Further testimony of Unddn's towering
position was provided when the Swedish Judge and the Swedish Commissioner in
Strasbourg joined forces to publish a Festschrift in his honor.
Professor Und6n's position, as he explained it to his subordinates and collabo-
rators in the Foreign Ministry, remained constant throughout the years. Undrn
believed that the European Convention was nothing but an experiment. It was
something completely new in the field of international law and consequently
something sui generis. It was an experiment because of the right of individual
35. Unddn had persuaded Sture Petrdn to give up his advanced legal studies for a doctoral degree to join the Foreign
Ministry instead.
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petition, which made the individual a subject of international law. It was also so
because the Convention concerned the member countries' domestic affairs, a subject
previously altogether outside international jurisdiction. What value this experiment
would have could only be told by the future. There was every reason to move very
cautiously.
C. The Declaration Under Article 46
Sweden made its declaration under Article 25 at the same time as it ratified the
Convention. It made none under Article 46, which permits any of the member states
to "at any time declare that it recognizes as compulsory ipsofacto and without special
agreement the jurisdiction of the Court in all matters concerning the interpretation and
application of the present Convention.' '36 This was very much the result of Professor
Unddn's dislike of the judicial function.
As Chairman of the Committee of Government Experts, Sture Petrrn had re-
ceived Und~n's personal instructions to oppose the original idea of establishing a
European Court with mandatory jurisdiction over human rights violations. France and
Italy in particular as well as Belgium, were strong proponents of such a Court; but
the Scandinavians were opposed. Sture Petr6n's position is reflected in the phrase
that "it has not yet been agreed that the creation of a European Court of Human Rights
at the present time corresponds to a real need." But the French pressed on, "since
only a Court that had all the characteristics of an impartial tribunal would be able to
ensure to the individual person (pour les assurer aux individus) the efficient protection
of human rights." In view of this, Sture Petr6n was instructed to suggest a compromise
solution, making the jurisdiction of the Court non-obligatory. This compromise idea
enjoyed a measure of success, but Und6n could not prevent Article 46, as finally
phrased due to French insistence, from committing all member states to the estab-
lishment of the Court. Thus, all member states carried responsibility for the Court's
existence. But Undrn saw to it that it was left to each member to decide for itself
whether its government wanted to be subject to the Court's jurisdiction. 37
At the outset, the Swedish government certainly had no intention to accept the
Court's obligatory jurisdiction by making the declaration under Article 46. It
followed that the powers of the Court were not a matter of primary Swedish interest,
and no objections were raised against the powers of the Court under Article 50.38
36. ARTICLE 46
1. Any of the High Contracting Parties may at any time declare that it recognises as compulsory ipsofacto and
without special agreement the jurisdiction of the Court in all matters concerning the interpretation and
application of the present Convention.
2. The declarations referred to above may be made unconditionally or on condition of reciprocity on the part
of several or certain other High Contracting Parties or for a specified period.
3. These declarations shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe who shall transmit
copies thereof to the High Contracting Parties.
37. See Saldn, Europaradets konvention om mdnskliga rdttigheter och friheter, F5Rmrt;sRXrrsuG rmsKRiFr
3 (1951).
38. ARTICLE 50
If the Court finds that a decision or a measure taken by a legal authority or any other authority of a High
Contracting Party is completely or partially in conflict with the obligations arising from the present Convention,
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Sweden had made no declaration under Article 46 when it ratified that
Convention. As long as Professor Undrn ruled the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it did
not intend to make one. The Minister remained adamant in his negativism. Although
pressure on the Foreign Ministry and on Sweden was building, Undrn's colleagues
in the government were unwilling to make a move that would disavow him. Thus, the
declaration under Article 46 was not made until 1966 when Professor Undrn,
replaced as Minister of Foreign Affairs, had also left the Diet. As the ultimate sign
of his influence, the bill proposing the making of the declaration did not come from
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs but from the Ministry of Justice.39 The Swedish
declaration was for a period limited to five years, but it has since been continuously
renewed.
D. The Greek Case
Making the declaration under Article 46, however, caused a fateful development
in Sweden. The coup d'etat in Greece on April 21, 1967, which brought the colonels
to power, met with much hostility in the Council of Europe when the news spread to
the "minisession" of the Assembly which was subsequently held. The "minisession"
resulted in a recommendation that member states bring an action against Greece under
Article 24 for having violated the Convention. 4° When the foreign ministers of the
Nordic countries met in Helsingfors, Finland in August that same year, the ministers
were briefed on the matter. On September 20, 1967, the Swedish government, joined
by the Danish and Norwegian governments, submitted an interstate application against
the Greek government (Applications 3323/67, cf 3321-3322), later amended; and they
were also joined by the Netherlands government (Application 3344/67). This case met
with much support from the Social Democratic political establishment in Sweden. Mrs.
Alva Myrdal, a member of the Swedish parliament and the cabinet, declared to the
Swedish public: "Now today's (Greek) regime is being made to answer for its deeds
before the open forum of Europe. '41
The Greek Case was terminated on April 15, 1969, by a resolution in the
Committee of Ministers (since Greece had made no declaration under Article 46, the
case consequently could not be brought before the European Court); but the Greek
government at that time decided to withdraw from the Council of Europe in such a
way that there was some doubt whether the decision of the Committee of Ministers
had had any legal effect.42
and if the internal law of the said Party allows only partial reparation to be made for the consequences of this
decision or measure, the decision of the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.
39. Kungl. Proposition 1966:33.
40. Resolution 246 of June 23, 1967.
41. Utrikesfragor 145 (1968).
42. For a summary of the Greek Case by the future President of the European Commission, see Fawcett, The
European Convention on Human Rights: Recent Trends, 24 Cumr L.OUAL PROBS. 253 (1971); a more elaborate discussion
is offered by Coleman, Greece and the Council of Europe-The International Legal Protection of Human Rights by the
Political Process, 1972 IsAEsL Y.B. op Hu . Ris. 121; Buergenthal, Proceedings against Greece under the European
Convention of Human Rights, 62 Asi. J. lIr'L L. 441 (1968).
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In Sweden, however, the effect was more than legal. From now on, the
Convention could not be disavowed by the Swedish government in matters of human
rights.
E. The Crisis of the 1970s
In the late 1960s a change of generations took place in the leadership of the
ruling Social Democratic Party. This change was marked by the advent of Olof Palme
and his men, most prominent among them being Carl Lidbom and Ingvar Carlsson
(now Prime Minister). Now it was time to carry out the Socialist ideas; this was the
moment for the great leap forward. The obstacles in the way were to be removed:
private ownership of land (a means of production); the courts being all too
independent of the political power; the family being a unit much too reactionary for
a progressive society; and private schools being all too capable of spreading
unhealthy ideas incapable of finding favor with the ruling party. It did not require
much insight to understand that in all these sectors a major conflict with the European
Convention was pending since the Convention guaranteed the right of property
(Article 1 of First Additional Protocol), saw the essence of the European legal
tradition in the right to a fair hearing before an independent and impartial court
(Article 6), and guaranteed the right to respect for family life, as well as respect for
the parents' religious and philosophical convictions in the education of their children
(Article 8, and Article 2 of the First Additional Protocol).
In 1969, Lidbom was made Minister without portfolio in the Palme Cabinet and
charged with the administration of human rights questions. He definitely had the
insight needed and sensed the imperative to disarm the Convention as a disturbing
factor in the intended development of the Swedish law.
The new ambitions required a deliberate move to integrate at least philosophi-
cally and culturally with the Socialist Camp, as indeed had been the expectation
voiced by Unddn and Erlander in 1950.4 3 In foreign affairs, as is well known, Sweden
engaged wholeheartedly in economic support of the Communist regimes in Cuba and
Vietnam, believing, as it was put, that "work to favour Social Democratic
values... is under way" in these countries. 44 On the cultural side too, the new
parallels became apparent. In my inaugural lecture as Professor of Jurisprudence, in
1970, I saw reason to express it as follows: "[In the Swedish public debate of today,
it is not difficult to discern those elements that predict the transition to a system
parallel in essential points to the one prevailing in the people's republics of Eastern
Europe. "45
43. In 1950, a formal declaration was made in the Swedish Diet to the effect that the Swedish example should show
"countries under the 'dictatorship of the proletariat' . . . that the change of the economic structure of society aimed at
in these countries . . . can be achieved while retaining a true political democracy." This declaration was read to the Diet
on March 22, 1950 by the Prime Minister Tage Erlander and the Foreign Minister Osten Und6n: see the Minutes in the
two Chambers of the Diet, Forsta Kammarens protokoll No. 11, 13 (1950), and Andra Kammarens protokoll No. 11, 11
(1950).
44. Gunnar StrSng, then Minister of Finance, interviwed in the periodical Frihet (SSU), No. 11112, 3 (1972).
45. SUtBRo, TE.EoGtsK srro, ocu r.AM .AY (Instituet for offentlig och internationell ratt No. 24) 1 (1970).
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Lidbom's activity covered several areas of interest in this connection: What
respect should be shown the European Convention, in particular, when revising the
expropriation law? Lidbom also worked on a dramatic volteface in family legislation.
The attitude towards judicial office was left in the hands of Dr. Lennart Geijer; the
imposition of a governmental monopoly on school education to Ingvar Carlsson.
The move to integrate began with the proposed new expropriation law which in
many ways carried the imprint of Lidbom's thinking. When the Svea Court of
Appeals was consulted for its opinion relating to the proposed law, it made some
references to the European Convention. This caused the Human Rights Minister to
express his displeasure in no uncertain terms in the parliamentary debate on
December 9, 1971. The opinion of the court was referred to as "a mistake on the part
of the Court of Appeals," a "stupidity," and "an opinion that the Svea Court of
Appeals will prefer to forget.' '46 This seems to have made Justice Bertil Bengtsson
drop every reference to the Convention issue from his commentaries on the resulting
expropriation law.
In connection with the Swedish Engine Drivers Case, however, more of
Lidbom's influence surfaced. The Drivers Union suit before the Labour Court came
first;47 next came the suit of one union member, Sandstrom, who sued in his personal
capacity, before the Supreme Court. 48 In both, a transformation theory was voiced
from the bench but hardly carried to its logical conclusion. The European Court
afterwards found in relation to the Drivers Union suit "that the Labour Court
carefully examined the complaints . . . not without taking into account Sweden's
international undertakings." The Supreme Court's main line of reasoning was to the
effect that the plaintiff had misinterpreted the meaning of the Convention. But
thereupon came the Rened Case49 in which the Supreme Administrative Court said:
An international agreement to which Sweden has adhered is not directly applicable in the
domestic administration of justice: instead, those legal provisions that are to be found in the
treaty must be included in a Swedish statute in order to be valid law in our country
(transformation). There has been enacted no such statute of transformation with regard to
Article 2 of the Additional Protocol of March 20, 1952, to the Council of Europe's
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Consequently,
no duty has arisen for the School Board to comply with the rules of the Additional Protocol
in its activities.50
In subsequent proceedings before the Convention organs, the Swedish Govern-
ment Agent referred to these decisions as "very clear statements by Swedish Courts
to the effect that international treaties, including the European Convention on Human
Rights, are not to be directly applied by Swedish courts." '5 1
46. Snabbprotokoll fran riksdagsdebatterna, No. 162, 36 (1971).
47. Arbetsdomstokens Domar, No. 5 (1972).
48. Nytt Juridiskt Arkiv 423 (1973).
49. Regeringsrdttens Arsbok 121 (1974).
50. Id.
51. See, e.g., Application 7805/77, the E-Meter Case.
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In the Socialist Camp, it should be recalled, the place left for courts is rather
restricted and "the judge is part of the unitary administration." 52 The early 1970s
saw Sweden moving closer to the Socialist Camp. Dr. Lennart Geijer, the Swedish
Minister of Justice, warned that "the courts do not exist outside of society, but are
societal agencies that offer a service to society." 53 Dr. Elwin, of a Marxist
persuasion, elaborates the idea further: "[I]n Sweden, the courts are seen as
implementing societal policy rather than as organs set up to protect the individual
against the interventions of the state." '54 Dr. Geijer adds: "[B]ehind the saying that
the courts are there to protect the individual against the 'authorities' there lurks an
anti-democratic criticism of the parliamentary system of government. . . .It is,
therefore, a dangerous saying.''55
Not unnaturally then, an effort was made at this time to staff the courts with
political appointees more aggressively loyal to the Social Democratic Party than
previously customary. 56 Thus, the lay assessors representing the Party were in-
structed in closed party sessions, and attempts on the side of the professional judiciary
to be invited to observe such indoctrination sessions were rejected with the remark
that the judge in question busied himself unduly with the affairs of the Social
Democrats. When the so-called lex Timrd was passed a few years later, it was
expressly stated in the parliamentary debate that "to us, Social Democrats, it can
never be a question of the responsibility for the political ideology ... disappearing
if we are elected lay assessors." 57
Also, in constitutional terms, the position of the judiciary was shaken. In a
doctoral dissertation published in 1973, it was asserted that "in Sweden, there is no
doubt that the judicial organs consider themselves subordinate to the highest political
organs [Parliament and Cabinet] . . .although these [judicial organs] under the
[1809] Constitution are equal to the former [political] organs and furthermore
nowadays have a law-making function that has clearly been spelled out." 58 The new
Constitution of 1974 brought the matter out into the open. "The new Constitution
completely discards the separation-of-powers system that characterized, orginally,
the 1809 Constitution.
'
"
59
Additionally, the new Constitution also included a provision as to how the Law
Council-a committee of high judges consulted for improvement of legislative
proposals-should carry out its tasks. Section 18 of Chapter 8 stated that the Council
should consider "how the proposed law harmonizes with the fundamental laws and
the rest of the legal system," a sweeping reference that may or may not include the
European Convention! A few years later the point was raised whether this council of
52. Slapnicka, NAT. L.F. 102, 114 (1963).
53. Public lecture in Lund, February 22, 1973.
54. Elwin, in FE=KsRaiFr TaIL, PE OLOp EKEL6F 244 (1972).
55. See supra note 53.
56. Cf. S6derlund v. Sweden, Application 5258)71, 43 ECHR CD 73.
57. Snabbprotokoll fr in riksdagsdebatterna 197576 nr 45, at 13. The Act is called lex Timrd; it reacted against the
Socialists in Timr- who had made a point of making only Socialists lay assessors.
58. FRRN BERO, O.I ANALOG vAkoN o AV PrrsSoR.ER 159 (1973).
59. K(Prop, 1973:90, 91, 155.
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judges was constitutionally competent to express an opinion relating to the European
Convention, if that opinion were to deviate from the view that had been taken by the
Swedish government in its capacity as the legal representative of Sweden in all
Convention matters. 6o
A great leap forward was also taken in family law. The new directives of 1969
for the revision of Swedish family law expressed the views of Lidbom, and included
the statement that there was no reason "to relinquish the use of statutory regulation
of marriage and family relations as one of several tools available" in the endeavors
to create a new society. 6' Indeed, as put by Professor Folke Schmidt, the directives
of 1969 present "basic evaluations with an openness seldom met with in political
life." 62
Finally, the leap was taken in the educational system. Ingvar Carlsson voiced
the new attitude. Since private schools were held to the same minimum standards
as the public schools, there was no reason to have different types of schools. In
1971, the National Board of Education received orders to arrange for the
discontinuation of the private schools, and in Stockholm some thirty of them
disappeared during the following years.
In 1974, the Human Rights Minister, Lidbom, summed up the new philosophy:
we have to "get rid of and consistently so, the view of times bygone that laws are
written to last for decades as expressions of some kind of immutable objective justice.
Laws should not be looked upon with submissive respect. For us they are working
tools to be used to achieve political goals .... We are pushing our positions in the
direction of our own values ... pushing the positions all the time in all fields is the
only possibility to get rid of, eventually, class society.' 63 In this way he implemented
the basic Marxist philosophy that the Law should not be used to protect the inherited
values, but rather should operate as the motor in society's progression towards the
ultimate, the end station of history: Communist society.
F. The Adverse Judgments of the 1980s
A long and deceiving calm followed. It mostly reflected the efficient muzzling
of dissenting voices. 64 Faced with the massive hostility of the media, controlled
mostly by the unions which in their turn were part of the Socialist machine, dissenters
were mainly relegated to samizdat activity. It went so far that in 1981 Sweden was
called the country in which the public lie had arrived at dizzying proportions.
Then suddenly, the early 1980s witnessed a formidable amount of Swedish
complaints in Strasbourg, shaking the Swedish political leadership which by and
large, and irrespective of political persuasion, remained ignorant of the Convention
and alien to its principles. The cases lost by the Swedish government, or settled by
60. G. Petrdn, SvJT, 136 (1980).
61. Riksdagsberattelsen Ju. 52 (1970).
62. Schmidt, The Prospective Law of Marriage, ScSt 213 (1971).
63. Pappersindustriarbetarefrrbundets kongressnahdlingar, 190 (1974).
64. See Sundberg, The Media and the Formation of Law, in FEsrsCuRr FUR DJmIcH OE ,.n 447 (R. Herzberg ed.
1985).
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it, could evidently not be handled by use of the transformation theory. A new
approach was necessary.
The first case lost was Sporrong Ldnnroth65 (although at that time already many
other cases were under way through the Strasbourg system). In 1982, the European
Court found the building bans and enormous delays which the applicants were
subjected to at the expropriation proceedings against the applicants, to be in violation
of the Convention, and in 1984 awarded an indemnity in the amount of one million
Swedish crowns. In 1986, the government paid the award to the applicants and
reported to the Committee of Ministers that according to a proposed new Act on
building and planning, "all building bans of the kind that existed in the Sporrong
Ldnnroth case will expire on January 1, 1987; and no new bans can be issued
thereafter." This made the Committee of Ministers declare that it had taken note and
thereby exercised its function under Article 54. The Swedish government let it be
known that this closed the case as far as the government was concerned. 66
This was hardly the whole truth. A quarter of one of the buildings affected by
the proceedings was owned by somebody who had not joined the proceedings in
Strasbourg. To this latecomer, however, an extra indemnity of 66,000 crowns was
paid in 1985 on the theory that if he had been present in the Strasbourg proceedings,
he would have been awarded this amount; but sixty-four more landowners in
Stockholm had been subjected to the same treatment under the same expropriations
plans during the same periods of time. Their total claim, computed along the same
line, amounted to 86 million crowns. When this was rejected by the government, a
new complaint was introduced before the Commission in Strasbourg. Moreover,
while it was true that the building bans were abolished under the intended new
system, the new system might be interpreted to mean that no land thereafter included
the right to build upon the land. Land ownership had indeed been given a new
meaning; but the new meaning looks pretty much like a permanent building ban on
all land, and the point is that the lifting of the "ban" is now done by asking for
permission to build. Whether this system is reconcilable with the holding in the
Sporrong Ldnnroth case is likely to be tested by more applications to the Convention
organs in Strasbourg.
The next case lost was the McGoff case in October 1984;67 but the case should
be viewed in connection with the friendly settlement in the Skoogstrdm case, 68 since
both concerned the same issue: the length of detention proceedings before a suspect
is placed before a court or an officer with judicial power under Article 5 (3). The case
was lost because the period of time before a suspect came before a Swedish court had
in these cases greatly exceeded the four days that had become the European minimum
standard found in the case law of the European Court. By making a friendly
65. Sporrong and .6nnroth v. Sweden, Applications 7151/75 and 7152/75, 1983 5 EHRR 35; 7 EHRR 256.
66. For a more detailed account, see J. S ND oRG, Huts RiGars tN SwrN, THE ANNUAL REORT FOR 1985 (1987).
67. MeGoff v. Sweden, Application 9017/80. The press release on the judgment, issued by the Registrar of the
Court on October 26, 1984, is numbered C (84) 76. For a full account, see J. SuNDsERG, Hustm RiesTs i SwEDEN, THE AsNsNu
REORTs 1982-1984 67-72 (1985).
68. Skoogstram v. Sweden, Application 8582f79, 1984 7 EHRR 263; 6 EHRR 77.
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settlement under Article 28 (b) in the one case while letting the other go to judgment,
the Swedish government exposed itself to the double legal effect of treaty and
precedent on an issue requiring changes in Swedish law and practice.69
Under the terms of the settlement in the Skoogstrm case (besides paying
Skoogstr6m an indemnity), the Government agreed to publish a summary of the
Commission's report to enable the Swedish judiciary and the prosecutors to avoid
creating situations in violation of the Convention. In the resulting article, it was
impressed upon the readers how important it was that the authorities make themselves
familiar with what the decision of the Commission meant. "The more the police, the
prosecutors and courts take into consideration the standards insisted upon by the
Convention of Europe when they apply the present rules, the more supple will be the
transition to a new system.' '70 Moreover, sensing the impending loss in Strasbourg,
the Government had already appointed in 1983 a Committee to oversee the relevant
statutory rules. In 1985, this Committee proposed "a procedure according to which
the prosecutor must submit to the court a request that the suspect be remanded in
custody as soon as possible after factual deprivation of liberty, i.e., usually on the
same day as he was apprehended or on the following day.' '71
Finally, in Bramelid and Malmstrdm,72 also a case lost by Sweden, the Swedish
government managed to convince the Commission, which had found the Swedish
Stock Corporations Act to be in violation of the Convention, that the matter was taken
care of by legislative change, and consequently there was no need for anything but the
Committee of Ministers to make a decision in accordance with Article 32. In this
case, the amendment of the Swedish statute-doing away with the compulsory
arbitration proceeding that had been found in violation of the Convention-took place
before June 7, 1984; the matter was decided by the Committee of Ministers on
October 25, 1984. As a side effect of the latter decision, although nothing had been
said about compensation of the applicants there, the Government indemnified them
for the costs of the human rights litigation. 73
IV. THE INNER HISTORY OF THE CONVENTION IN SWEDEN
A. The Philosophical Background
In few countries was the European Convention the cause of such formidable
philosophical difficulties as in Sweden. This had to do with the firmly established
position which had been enjoyed by the Uppsala School in Swedish legal, political,
and cultural life.
The prophet of the Uppsala School, or the Scandinavian Realists as they are
often referred to, was Axel Hiigerstrtm. He entered the arena at the same time as
Sweden entered the 20th century. After toiling for many years, he finally succeeded
69. See J. SUNDBEo, HuMAN RIGHTS N SwEENs, THE ANNUAL REoRTS 1982-1984 64-72 (1985).
70. J. SuNDOBERG, Hut RIGHTS INSwEDN, THE ANNuAL REPoRTs 1982-1984 70 (1985).
71. See Gripen Anhilen H~ktad: Straffprocessuella Tvingsmedel m.m. 27 (1985).
72. Bramelid and Malmstr6m v. Sweden, Applications 8588/79 and 8589/79, 5 EHRR 24 9 (1985).
73. Id. See further J. SuNDBERo, Humm RIGrrs IN Sw.DEN, THE ANNUAL REPORTS 1982-1984 60-63 (1985).
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in unseating the Bostr6mian school of thought, which until then had forged the ways
of thinking for generations of university-educated civil servants. Thereafter,
Hfigerstr6m carried the day.
According to the Hdigerstr5mians, moral ideas are only value judgments;
consequently, they are only expressions of emotions. To speak of the truth or
non-truth of a moral idea was meaningless. Hdgerstr6m's thinking here finally carried
into value nihilism. There were no objective ethical duties, only feelings of duty.
Consequently, there could exist neither legal duties nor any corresponding rights. To
know what was right, to feel what was right, to believe in justice or being righteous,
all this was nothing but emotion.
It may seem as if Hdgerstr6m thus wanted to reduce concepts like legal rights
and duties to absolute zero. His conclusion, writes Olivecrona, is however:
What we have in our minds when talking about rights is a power. But it is a power raised
above the facts of social life. He, therefore, calls it a "supernatural" power. Since it is
impossible to grasp this power with the mind, he also calls it "mystical," or "metaphys-
ical."74
But there he stopped. The actual use of the notion of a right in social life was a matter
he left to others to discuss.
Others did discuss it, in particular legal scholars who were driven by Hdgerstr6m
into a kind of academic Siberia, since they no longer could claim to be dealing with
scientific truths. In fact, the better part of the first half of the 20th century was
dominated by the lawyers' attempts to reestablish themselves in the academic
community that dealt with scientific truth. Hdgerstr6m's pupil, Anders Vilhelm
Lundstedt, was a leading figure in this; but there were many others. Addressing the
notion of rights, he found them to be nothing but advantageous positions which have
followed as a corollary to a consequence of maintaining statutory rules.
In this atmosphere, which lasted for more than half a century, the worst insult
one could make was to suggest that one's adversary believed in natural law. None in
the present generation of Swedish civil servants who received their legal training at
the universities will be able to recall a kind word ever being said about natural
law.Consequently, it is a sensational reminder, much called for, which is put forward
by Professor Strahl in his university textbook Makt och rdtt (Power and Law), where
he says that "natural law ideas are in fact quite common abroad" (i.e., outside
Sweden).
In such a context, the introduction of the notion of human rights meant a
revolution. Are there limits to what the powerholders can lawfully will, to what the
government can legitimately decree? The Swedish response was to try to distinguish
the notion of "right" in the declaration of rights as different from the notion of
"right" in statute law.
In statute law, the notion of right operates as a name for certain premises that must exist in
order to make the specific, carefully specified, legal effects take place. The rights in the
74. K. OUVEMOmA, T~m THworws op HcEusm6m. AND LummswhOT 130 (1959).
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declaration of rights should be understood as something different, namely as ideals, of
necessity vaguely phrased, for the legal regulation of the coexistence of human beings. 75
Anticipating difficulties for his students, who had been fed the Higerstrfmian
message for so long, he suggests that in order to understand the new notion of human
rights one should "conceive of the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights as a
proclamation of ideals that the legislatures are exhorted to realize." 76 But generally
speaking, the Scandinavian Realists preferred to look the other way. The question
whether the legal system is legitimate has no intelligible meaning, maintained Alf
Ross. 77 "Nobody is interested in pursuing the search for criteria of validity" at this
level, wrote Per Olof Ekel6f.78Having this for a background, it is perhaps not so
surprising to hear that a favorite line of one of the Scandinavian Presidents of the
European Commission, Max Sorensen (who succeeded Sture Petr6n), was that "if the
Continentals had not invented this human rights business, we Scandinavians needed
never to bother about it."
Scandinavian Realism did not make for bad lawyers. Excellent legal minds were
to be found quite irrespective of the school: Sorensen himself is good evidence. But
the outlook of the bureaucrats was affected, certainly in Sweden. Most who were
exposed to the teaching of Lundstedt that rights do not exist have passed away now.
For many it was a shocking experience. All that they had been told about right and
wrong was only superstition? All legal discussion of the limits to the power of the
state was only superstition? What remained found no outlet but by the worship of
power, because power was no superstition. Thus, there developed a bureaucratic
profile. The adoration of the state that had characterized the Bostrdmian school was
gladly inherited, but it combined with the submissiveness faced with power which
came from the Uppsala School. United in the person of the civil servant, the message
of the two philosophical schools was that the state was God and state power was right.
Scholarly discussion was barely tolerated. But servility, when associating with
political power, became fashionable.
Bureaucrats taught in the Scandinavian Realist tradition were sure to find the
Socialist tradition easier to understand than the Western human rights rhetoric. The
Socialist collectivist philosophy, after all, subordinated rights to some overriding goal
(making society develop towards Communism); and that meant that human rights
could be no more than the mirror image of whatever legislation the powerholders
enacted. The Scandinavian Realist felt at home.
B. The Secret Marriage
Sweden, furthermore, is faced with an important background factor in the form
of the so-called "secret marriage" between the Social Democratic movement and the
Uppsala School of Scandinavian Realism. There is a close relationship between the
75. 1. S1,na.i, M xr ocH PXTr 124 (8th ed. 1979).
76. Id.
77. A. Ross, DAsK srTAsroRFAhnGs, r, BdI, 133 (1959).
78. P.O. Ekel6f, Uttrycket gdllande rsttsregel. En studie i juridisk terminologi, in NORDISK GENrLAO. Fsmsrssr
m. CARL JACOB Ap.mrou 117 (1969) -The passage is missing in the English version, see ScSt 71 If (1971).
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Swedish political leadership and the philosophy inaugurated by HdigerstriSm: "Big
Brother's Grandpa" 79 as he has been labeled. When, during the first decades of this
century, Hdgerstrm developed the philosophy that was to evolve into the Uppsala
School, the benches in the hall were filled by the future leadership of the Social
Democratic Party. A. V. Lundstedt made the school renowned for the manifesto that
"rights do not exist." The usefulness of this philosophy to a political party which
wanted to socialize the means of production in society became evident among the
Socialists during the 1920s; and it was put to extensive use in their political
campaigns, in particular in 1928 when their opponents chose the protection of
property for their political platform. "You must understand, that the talk about a new
statute being capable of violating the right of property is as meaningless as a parrot's
babble" was a famous line of Lundstedt, coined for the fight. 80
Armed with this notion, the Social Democratic Party, which beginning in 1933
came to rule Sweden for almost half a century, set out to achieve socialization by
legislatively voiding the contents of the notion of property. This policy, called " the
socialization of functions" (funktionssocialism), only took away the functions of
ownership and left the empty notion where it lay, the point being that no
compensation was necessary. One of the masterminds behind this secret marriage was
indeed Professor Osten Undfn, who succeeded in redefining the right of ownership
in such a way that the bureaucrats could handle it unhampered by the fact that
philosophically it was meaningless.
To the bureaucrats too, the secret marriage was most beneficial. In the West, the
notion of a right was coupled with the individual, not with the state; and rights
emphasized personal initiative, not public organization. The Socialist view empha-
sized the latter, presupposing a positive role for government. A massive governmen-
tal involvement in all areas of society was required if one were to turn employment,
health care, housing, old age, and disability pensions into some kind of "rights."
The bureaucracy was given a vital role in representing the interests of the collective
in society and in coordinating community activity. The bureaucracy saw little reason
to regret joining a political movement intent upon expanding their base and enhancing
the role of the bureaucrats.
This syndrome is well illustrated by the case of Dag Hammarskj6ld, later the
Secretary General of the United Nations. He had been Under-Secretary in the
Ministry of Finance in 1936, after having completed a doctoral thesis written in a very
Hdgerstr6mian climate. He is reputed even to have coined the Swedish word for a
planned economy: planhushcllning,81 and he was the one who drafted the Swedish
currency legislation in 1939 along such totalitarian lines that even today, a Swedish
student in the United States with some kind of American grant cannot take the money
out of his savings account in order to pay his way locally (rent, tuition, etc.) without
79. Ewr.ssEN April 8, 1985. The "Big Brother" is, of course, taken from George Orwell's 1984.
80. Compare Lundstedt, The Responsibility of Legal Science for the Fate of Man and Nations, 10 N.Y.U. L.Q.R.
326 (1933).
81. Von Baumgarten, Det idehistoriska perspektivet, in J. SUNDBuEG, SPOsRONG L6NNRom, EN HANDBOK 249 n. 92
(1985).
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first cabling the National Bank of Sweden for permission. Otherwise, he commits a
grave crime. In a letter written in 1958, Hammarskj6ld indeed confessed that
"meeting Axel H~egerstr6m 
-as an individual and as a scholar-was not only one
of the greatest experiences of my study years: but it has retained its importance
throughout the years." '8 2 After ten years in the Ministry of Finance, Hammarskjld
received the corresponding post in the Foreign Ministry. Trying to find a potential
successor to Undfn, Dr. Tage Erlander, the Prime Minister at that time, insisted on
making Hammarskjild a member of his Cabinet. Hammarskj6ld was hard to persuade
-he confided that he always voted with other parties-but finally accepted and
became Minister without portfolio in the Socialist Cabinet in 1951, from which post
he was called in 1953 to become Secretary-General of the United Nations. 83 In the
latter capacity, he then surprised his Western collaborators by being completely
unconcerned with human rights. 84
C. Professor Und~n and Human Rights
Knowing the outstanding importance of Dr. Unddn in the field, his towering
position generally, and his role as a link between the political leadership and the
scholarly community, his analysis of the human rights issues should be noted.
While aloof to the rather exaggerated ways in which his colleague, Professor
Lundstedt, pressed the message (a blend of pro-Socialist and anti-metaphysist
statements), Und~n definitely worried about the ban on all legal thinking that was
implicit in the Hdgerstr6mian message. Trying to come to grips with it in his
contribution to a Festschrift for Higerstr6m in 1928 (Nigra synpunkter pfi begrepps-
bildningen inom juridiken), he eventually put a textbook definition of the right of
ownership into the 1946 edition of his book on movable property. He wrote:
Once the determination by the organs of the State what the interests of society and the
individuals demand has yielded legal rules on how far the right of ownership extends or is
restricted, then the Law will adapt its notions accordingly. The right of ownership is
consequently a relative notion and a "functional notion." It is built on the statutory rules in
force and is used as a mere formula or unit of meaning.8 5
This approach to the rights notion was thereupon made sacrosanct and finally, in
1962, introduced into the elementary textbook for law students, which meant that the
generations of lawyers who have left the universities since the 1960s all carry the
deep imprint of this type of definition.8 6
Being asked on March 20, 1952, to sign for Sweden the First Additional
Protocol to the European Convention, including the protection of property found in
Article 1, Undfn certainly felt the burden of his past. One cannot take the guarantee
of human rights as a mere reference to what the statutes of specific municipal systems
guarantee as a right, because should one do that, one would open up the possibility
82. M. WAuzR, AxEL HAGEsrEOM - mansKAN som A KANDE 207 (1961).
83. Y. Mf~tu, OsTr UN. EN BioR ' 399 (1986).
84. J. HumpmREY, HuMAN RGtrrs AND THE UNrrED NATONS: A GREAT ADvNTURE 270 (1984).
85. 0. UND9N, SvENsK smAX. lUs EmEmm 84 (1946).
86. A. MALMSTRSM, ClvnRAXT jkAT'E MA GRA GRUNDDRAG VDEN ALLMANNA RATSLXRA 24-26 (lst ed. 1962).
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for any municipal system to decide for itself what kind of problems should be left out
of the guarantee. That cannot be the idea behind a guarantee of human rights: it would
not be meaningful. Sensing this, and with his background in the Uppsala School,
Unddn must have disliked intensely this First Additional Protocol protecting, inter
alia, the right of property against statutory encroachment. The conflict burdened him,
and he addressed it in an article after he stepped down as Minister of Foreign Affairs.
He asserted there that human rights are nothing but a way to "stress the importance
of certain democratic principles" so that they are "likely to be imprinted in a nation's
mind as self-evident and important values." 8
7
Unddn was known as "a Marxist lawyer who benevolently followed the great
Socialist experiment to the East." 88 He absolutely refused to equate Hitler's and
Stalin's regimes. 89 He came to share increasingly the negative view of judicial
independence that prevailed in the Socialist Camp. To him, judicial review was
unacceptable. 90 The European system disgusted him in its judicial aspects, and he
focused his interest on the working of the Committee of Ministers in the system. His
approach was mirrored in the first Cyprus Case.91The Greek application was declared
admissible, and the Commission made its report and filed it with the Committee of
Ministers. In the meantime, however, the British suspended some of the measures
which were the subject of complaint. In the correspondence between Sture Petrdn, as
a member of the Commission, and his Foreign Minister, Undfn, the latter developed
what he considered to be the role of the Committee of Ministers:
When the Committee of Ministers has been empowered to express its opinion as to whether
a violation of the Convention has taken place, and to impose sanctions, the thinking has no
doubt been, that the members should have a freer position than, for instance, members of a
court. Not in the sense that the Committee of Ministers should be able to base itself on
reasons of opportunity rather than on legal reasons; but in that way that the Committee of
Ministers may for instance ignore a literal interpretation, if such an interpretation appears to
be exaggeratedly rigorous.The Committee of Ministers may on the whole see more to the
spirit than to the letter and need not stamp as a violation measures of minor
importance.... The Committee of Ministers has to establish whether there has been a
violation of the Convention or not. Reasonably, it should be possible to have a debate in
which other members participate; but if the accusations are trifling or otherwise spurious, it
would seem that the Committee of Ministers may refrain from taking action.
In the matter at issue, Undfn held it to be correct, as Petrfn had done, to
establish-in spite of the new British measure-whether there had been a violation in
the past, "but as a rule, it should be better in view of the more extensive discretionary
87. 0. Uruiu, TAsxAR ot urmmuspouT 12 (1963).
88. F. PALmTRNA, FDtRm I MIAN HAND, ML\-'ar, 1945-73 193 (1976).
89. Y. MWu.R, OmirN UNm-N. E'i wcRAn 541 (1986).
90. Undfn, SvJT, 260-63 (1956).
91. Greece v. United Kingdom, Application 176/56 (cf. Application 299157). The most informative published
account of these proceedings seems to be Bement, The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, 24 Prrr. L. REv. 563, 570 (1963). Compare also the account given by the Secretary-General of
the Commission, Anthony B. McNulty, The Operation and Effectiveness of the European Convention on Human Rights,
3 U.S.F. L. Rv. 231 (1969).
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powers of the Committee of Ministers, that it declines to consider such an
accusation."
Towards the end of his rule, in the early 1960s, so many states had made
declarations under Article 46 that a sense of uneasiness spread in the Foreign
Ministry; questions in parliament were repeatedly addressed to the issue, and Und6n
became involved in public debate over the matter with the Norwegian Chief Justice
Terje Wold. Und6n, perhaps defensively, refrained from intervening in the debate
over the implications in Swedish law of a hypothetical adversary judgment of the
Hague Court, which debate had been initiated by Sture Petr6n when reporting on his
success as Government Agent in the case Netherlands v. Sweden, the so-called Boll
Case;92 but when the matter of the European Court's jurisdiction was brought up, the
Und6n "Wall" was unbreakable. "I don't think so," (Jag t6cker inte det!) was his
only reply.
D. The Swedish Silence
Faced with the combined might of political resolution and scholarly reputation,
the bureaucracy at large lost interest in the European Convention. It was seen as a
matter for a couple of experts in the Foreign Ministry and perhaps one or two
professors. Being a foreign affairs matter, it was of absolutely no interest in the
Swedish administration of justice.
The bureaucracy was all the happier to take this approach since the sense after
the Lidbom intervention in the Diet in 1971 was that the Convention was a
"political" matter. Ever since the advent of the "new teaching" in the late 1960s,
the bureaucracy was aware that when a matter was called "political" in nature, it was
not for them to deal with. It awaited political decision. Increasingly, this made the
civil servants unwilling, or unable, to ask questions of principle. Just as the computer
commits no errors, so the bureaucracy was committing none. Errors are committed
only by the programmer, that is to say, the legislature.
This inability was certainly appreciated by the holders of power. The former
Minister of Justice, Ove Rainer, says in his book, The Powers:
Work for the Government to a great extent being based on using judges for various tasks is
something unique. Excepting that the system to some extent is used in Denmark and
Finland, it is practically unknown abroad.
In many other European countries, it is customary instead that lawyers are employed
and recruited from the law faculties or the academies to do legislative and treaty work.Theirs
is a more theoretical and formal view of the law than the one we have. This difference in
outlook is not an unimportant reason why we are in difficulties, e.g., in the application of
the European Convention on Human Rights. 93
Among the bureaucrats, he was supported by their silence. Few people have an
interest in making the situation under the Convention better known, it was said after
92. See J. Sundberg, Implementing the European Convention on Human Rights in Sweden: The Boll Case
Discussion, in LAws, RiGmus, AND mmI EuRoPEAN CONVENMON  HmmN RIams 69-82 (J. Sundberg ed. 1986).
93. RAINER, MAKFERNA 19 (1984).
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the 1982 judgment in Sporrong Ldnnroth. "Most people hope to prevent any further
complaints being brought before the Commission based on the rule in Article 6 by
remaining silent.' '94
"Human rights" is an issue so charged that in the minds of ordinary people it
is not easily dismissed as merely a matter of foreign affairs. The silence of the
bureaucracy was resented. It was increasingly interpreted in terms of "the Swe-
dish fear," the "lawyers' silence," or the "society of trembling knees" (knd-
skilvesamhillet), a term coined by a Norwegian author and not kindly meant.
To this should be added the strange media situation. The Convention was a
non-issue to most of the media because it was a legal matter and because so much of
the thinking took place on the abstract European level, totally beyond the reach of the
almost without exception legally untrained Swedish journalists. Time and again it
would be discovered that the media had deliberately suppressed news forthcoming
from Strasbourg. Perhaps the most sensational illustration of this occurred when the
Swedish media had nothing to say about the friendly settlement between Sweden and
four other countries on the one side, and Turkey on the other, while this news was
reported the following day by most other European media. To the Swedish media, it
was not news fit for print.95
It remains for future historians to look at the avalanche of Swedish complaints
sent to Strasbourg in the early 1980s and analyze what factors brought them about.
My own impression from the period is, however, that a wave of indignation had been
building up during the 1970s, waiting to be released by simple "bread-and-butter"
information about the Convention. Feeling that they were abused in a highly taxed
society, people increasingly focused their fears on the agencies that meant most to
their lives and holding unchecked power: the social welfare board and the tax board.
Feeling unable to receive a hearing either with the bureaucracy or in the mass media,
people looked around in despair. Then, on September 29, 1983, the European
Convention system profited from a completely unplanned marketing device.This was
the careless remark of the Prime Minister, Olof Palme, mercilessly published by a
major daily, Svenska Dagbladet, in which the Prime Minister referred to the
European Court as the "kindergarten" of Justice Gustaf Petrdn. 96 This type of
childish comment was important in Sweden. The "Petrdn's Kindergarten" image
spread like wildfire and reappeared in numerous references in the press and
elsewhere. It is thought provoking to find it mirrored in an editorial titled, "What the
Kindergarten Can Do," which in fact reviewed an article in an American legal
periodical by Professor Frowein. 97 Once information was forthcoming on how to use
its instrumentalities, people's hopes turned to this "Kindergarten." In 1983 and 1984
some 10,000 copies of an instruction about the Convention machinery were released
94. Petrln, Consequences of the Ratification of the European Convention on Human Rights in Swedish Law, in
Lmms, RIGmS AND im E o P.AN CoNXuhTo.I 50 (J. Sundberg ed. 1986).
95. See further the chapter on The Friendly Settlement with Turkey, in J. Su-oNEaR, HtAtN RiGms u SwrDE, THm
ANNuAL RE oRT FOR 1985 (1987).
96. For a full account, see J. SUNDBEuG, Hutmi; Ricms m SWEEN, THE AmuAL REoms 1982-1984 36 (1985).
97. Frowein, European Integration Through Fundamental Rights, 18 MicH. J.L. Rr. 5 (1984); comments in the
editorial Lekstugans m5jligheter, Svenska Dagbladet, June 16, 1985.
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among the general public, followed by an edition of the Swedish translation of the
Convention. This would seem to be a major element in the 1983 breakthrough of the
idea.98
V. THE SUCCESS OF AN IDEA
A. The Change Summarized
Let me summarize the changes now described. Here is Sweden, a country that
succeeded longer than most to stay removed from the Convention. Behind the barrier
of a different language, and faced with an uninterested bureaucracy, deeply
impressed by the "secret marriage"; arrogant and ignorant mass media, massively
hostile to the European idea; and a sleepy academic community, sometimes
awakening to hope for a speedy transfer to the ranks of the bureaucracy, the European
Convention remained almost unknown to the Swedish people for decades. Apathy
and distance were not reduced by the fact that the Convention reflected an American
constitutional tradition.
Then, out of nothing, came this sudden breakthrough of the early 1980s.
Without any change worthy of mention in the basic legal structure in Sweden, the
Convention was put to more use in Sweden than in any other European country,
perhaps even a better use. This was a crisis of a fundamental kind. Evidently,
traditional beliefs, attitudes, and values no longer commanded virtually automatic
assent from most members of the Swedish society. That should drive thoughtful men
once more to examine some of the bases of the legal order, and perhaps suggest new
answers to old questions.
What has happened, of course, is a reminder of the force inherent in the human
rights idea, turning the legal system upside down. It is also true that the change has
much to do with the peculiar properties of the European Convention itself, that it was
drafted as lawyers' law, making it an instrument that lawyers can handle. This makes
us believe that the impact of the European Convention will go progressively deeper.
It will do so because it also creates an American-type situation, characterized by a
(relative) unity of language and a multiplicity of states. This makes it likely that
factors that can be seen at work in the American environment also may be expected
to make an impact in the European one.
Let us take a closer look.
B. Irresistibility of the Lawyer's Approach
The formulation in detail of the "rights" section of the European Convention
made room for lawyers' universal quest for systematization and legal certainty. This
was a major factor when the 11,000 cases were processed. Whenever a case was
decided, the precedent of the action provided guidance for the Commission in similar
cases. That precedents are followed means that announced doctrines are repeated.
98. For a more elaborate discussion, see J. SutDBnEo, HuMAN Rsors iN SwEDEN, THE ANA RPORT FOR 1935 (1987).
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The existence of a record of prior cases, combined with the Commission's desire to
follow precedent, is a factor providing for the certainty of the law.
This effect, which perhaps may be identified with lawyers' instinct, received
added momentum by the very nature of the Convention calling for an independent
European systematization whenever national legal systems were challenged. The
Convention extends a guarantee to the individual against the state. This guarantee
cannot be made dependent upon that state and what it commands as its legal order,
because otherwise the guarantee would be meaningless; it must rely on something that
may be called the autonomous European legal notion. This has been firrnly
established in relation to the concept of "civil right" in Article 6, but it seems indeed
called for in relation to almost any legal term used in the Convention. In this way, a
nationally conceived positivism is swept aside, not by natural law (although perhaps
there is room for that), but by the very European nature of the Convention.
C. The European Limelight
Europe is divided by the multiplicity of its languages. Not since cosmopolitan
medieval times, when Latin was the language of daily communication thoughout
Europe's higher social levels, has Europe experienced the immediate intellectual
community that goes with a common language. What this means may not be
immediately understood in English-speaking countries, such as the United States,
where everything written in English is readily accessible to any reader from any of the
other countries.
In Europe, this multiplicity has meant a comfortable relative anonymity. For
French- and German-speaking Continentals, observing what was taking place in one
of the Scandinavian countries meant a real effort. Conversely, much would go
unnoticed behind this language barrier.
This has been changed in no little degree by the European Convention. In
Strasbourg, legal opinions and arguments stemming from the odd-language-speaking
countries are (after proper release of the documents) made available in translation to
English or French, the official languages of the Council of Europe, and thus available
for all to read. Within the framework of the Convention, decision makers in Europe
now have no more protection than they would have in the United States.
With the comfortable relative darkness gone, the civil servants in Sweden found
themselves in the European limelight when their cases were taken to Strasbourg. For
many, this was quite a traumatic experience. 99 It made them look with a great deal
more apprehension to what could be expected from Strasbourg, and created among
them an awareness of the European dimension in which they were acting. A recent
cartoon in a Swedish daily makes the point convincingly. It shows a bureaucrat at his
99. Compare the excited reaction of my Norwegian colleague, Professor Atle Grahl Madsen (University of
Bergen, Norway) when the international spotlight hit the strange Swedish practice to appoint NATO legal scholars to
assist Swedish military commissions. Sweden adheres to such a prohibitive notion of "neutrality" that even joining the
Common Market was supposed to be beyond reach: Norway is part of the military alliance known as NATO. See Madsen,
Sweden and Humanitarian Law, 18 AKRoi L. REv. 469 (1985).
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desk. An unknown opens the doors and whispers: "God sees you, and so does the
Court of Europe."
D. Room for a Pluralist Doctrine of Precedent
It is the American law under the jurisdiction of the several states that most
resembles in character the situation under the European Convention. What lawyers
have contributed in this field in the United States, therefore, also has a message for
the Europeans. An important part of this message has to do with the doctrine of
precedent.
In the United States, precedent has come to mean something very different from
what is found in the British (now deserted) doctrine of stare decisis. It is a doctrine
of precedent pluralist in character. The hierarchy of courts is not a matter of great
importance. In every case argued, counsel on both sides will urge upon the court a
whole flood of cases. Counsel and judges alike, when they quote cases, are likely to
quote cases from other jurisdictions or even from inferior courts. For example, the
seven volumes reporting the decisions of the New York Court of Appeals between
January 1919, and October 1921, indicate that this New York court had cited 238
Massachusetts cases, 207 English cases, and 74 Illinois cases. Precedents are dealt
with largely as illustrations. Lawyers cull from them phrases that seem to them well
expressed. Precedent of this kind exercises no compulsion; it is evidently at most
persuasive in various degrees. O0 It has been suggested that this tendency which the
American Law Institute addresses as the instinct of lawyers ("our instinct to regard
as authority the prior decision of any court on a matter pertinent to the case under
consideration") is really the result of the use of the case method at the American law
schools, the essence of which is the aim of finding the best solution to a problem on
the bases of examples from many jurisdictions.101 Whatever this tendency does, it
certainly creates an awareness of a common heritage among those who practice it.
To Europeans, it is then noteworthy that this American way of working also
made room for national ambitions to overcome the multiplicity of jurisidictions and
kept the system together as an identifiable (North) American legal system. It may
suffice here to point to the more ambitious, so-called national law schools (in turn,
influencing the writing of textbooks for their students) and to the American Law
Institute. Its traditions of restatements that try to keep a national perspective of the
legal development in spite of the multiplicity of jurisdictions lead eventually to the
drafting of uniform laws to be adopted by the various states. The stunning success of
the Uniform Commercial Code shows the viability of the idea.
Looking at Europe from this American perspective, it is soon discovered that
things are under way which perhaps otherwise would go unnoticed. That the present
European human rights system means a focus being set on the European cases is, of
course, a commonplace; but it means more than that. Alessandra Luini del Russo puts
100. Report of Committee on Establishment, in TIE A sEcaAN LAW INSrTIur 50rH ANon RsARv 67 (1973); cf. Radin,
The Trail of the Calf, 32 CorL. L.Q. 137, 158 (1946).
101. CRoss, THE ENGLISH LAW OF PREcEDENT 18 (3d ed. 1977).
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it very perceptively: "[T]hrough the adjudication of these cases, a rich international
jurisprudence of human rights has been developed by the two major institutions of the
European Convention, laying the foundations for a European common law of
fundamental freedoms." 10 2
Polys Modinos puts it slightly differently: "[T]he case-law of the Commission
and court is in [the] process of creating uniform law in the highly important field of
man's basic personal and civic rights." 1 0 3
The European Court of Human Rights is no "fourth instance." It lacks the
power either to reverse or to annul the determination of the national courts.
Consequently, one finds nowhere the hierarchical tie which is essential to many
versions of the doctrine of precedent; but the American pluralist doctrine does not
require that tie. The European legal systems, normally professing very lax versions
of the doctrine of precedent, if indeed any at all, find no difficulty in making room
for a pluralist doctrine. Such a doctrine is equally natural under the aegis of the
European Convention as it is commonplace in the field of uniform law. Testimony to
this may be obtained from the case reporting system published by Unidroit in Rome,
covering the interpretations in national case law of the various Conventions
establishing uniform law. 104 In the Nordic countries, the same phenomenon will be
found in the field of the many and important Nordic uniform laws (the Sale of Goods
Act, the Instruments of Indebtedness Act, etc.), los served by the case reporter series
Nordisk Domssamling, and in particular in maritime law, since 1900 and to date
served by the series Nordiske Domme i Sjofartsanliggender.
The avenue is thus wide open to a development along the American lines,
reinforcing the awareness of the European heritage; and the avenue is also open to a
further development of European ambitions to overcome the multiplicity of jurisdic-
tions and keep the system together as an identifiable European legal system.
E. Does It Pay to Argue the Convention?
Room for the pluralist doctrine is widened by adding the risk of reversal to the
thinking. Judges do not as a rule care to risk reversals that can be predicted. The
threat of censure by Convention organs today hangs over every national judiciary and
administration. That threat evidently becomes more vivid and immediate when
argument before the national court is developed by means of European precedents.
Counsel is increasingly aware of this. The European Commission has also discreetly
made its presence more felt in the national administration of justice by insisting, as
a matter of exhausting domestic remedies under Article 26, that during such
procedures the litigant should be able to put exactly the same questions and to raise
exactly the same issues before the national court as may be dealt with by the
102. del Russo, Prisoners' Right of Access to the Courts: A Comparative Analysis of Human Rights Jurisprudence
in Europe and the United States, 13 J. INr'L L. & ECO,. 1, 4 (1978) (emphasis added).
103. Modinos, Effects and Repercussions of the European Convention on Human Rights, 11 Il'L. & COMP. L.Q.
1097, 1107 (1962).
104. Uniform Law Cases.
105. See, e.g., Hellner, Unification of Law in Scandinavia, 16 Am. J. Coss'. L. 88 (1968).
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Commission and the Court later. Litigants desirous of exhausting their domestic
remedies presumably impress the European dimension by such argument. What they
say also may be interpreted as more pitfalls now being created for the career official:
there are now more ways to commit a mistake which may speed the ascent of one's
rivals to more elevated positions in the judiciary.
How effective is this? Studies focusing on the relevance of the Strasbourg
practice in the several European states have tried to find the extent to which national
courts have referred to and relied on that practice. If the results have been meager,
this may be explained by the fact that these studies were undertaken long ago, and
that they seem to use an unsatisfactory method. A judgment consists on closer
analysis of three separate parts: the order, the opinion, and the argument of the
parties, often but not always, summarized in the recital (or descriptive) part of the
judgment. One cannot conclude from the fact that the Convention was not referred to
in the order or the opinion that it was not relevant, if in fact counsel used it in his
argument. A better approach (which also has been tried) 1' 6 would seem to be to
explore to what extent counsel includes the element of the Convention in his
argument. A simpler approach, less wasteful in time and effort, is to ask counsel
whether he thinks it pays to argue the Convention before the national court.
Among experienced practitioners in Sweden today the answer to the latter
question is undoubtedly "Yes" (although with some reservations, mainly based on
the diplomacy of the art). It is today-since the early 1980s-by no means unusual
to find the Convention or Strasbourg cases referred to in argument, in particular
written arguement; and the judgment, while seldom mentioning this argument, will
often be so drafted as to align itself with the position which seems desirable in view
of the Convention arguments.
F. Conclusions
The European Convention's sudden breakthrough in Swedish legal life means a
crisis for those who took the Swedish legal order as a self-evident and "given" entity
and who never thought at all about fundamental legal problems, or if they did, they
soon arrived at tolerably satisfactory answers, couched in terms of the values and
beliefs widely accepted as unquestionably true. Suddenly they are forced to reassess
some of the fundamentals of the situations and wake up to the Europeanization of the
government and affairs of the Kingdom of Sweden.
This Europeanization of Sweden is in turn, as I believe to have shown, a result
of the development of ideas with a definite American coloring and conducive to
situations in which the Americans have the most extensive experience. The
awakening will, no doubt, be traumatic. In a relative sense, the Americans have been
much more aware of what is taking place in Europe than the Swedes. It is no
coincidence that the discussions of these very European affairs which may be found
in American legal periodicals vastly surpasses in volume, expertise, and insight
106. Cf. Lockwood, The United Nations Charter and United States Civil Rights Litigation: 1946-55, 69 IowA L.
REv. 900 (1984), see in particular Appendix.
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everything that has been published about the European Convention in Sweden-in
spite of the fact that Sweden itself is part of the Convention system. The
Europeanization of Swedish legal life thus being progressively under way, it seems
proper to pay tribute to the American Law for its role as a cornerstone in the European
building.

